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Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code §
78-2-2(2XJ) (West 2002).
Statement of Issues
Whether directing and delivering notice of claim to a listed office of the State's
attorney general satisfies the notice of claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act?
Whether, because several offices exist for the attorney general, the notice
provisions of the Act are satisfied where notice is delivered to one of the listed addresses
and the State has an opportunity to investigate, remedy and possibly settle the matter
without litigation?
Whether directing and delivering notice of claim to Heber Valley Railroad's
executive director satisfies the notice provisions of the Act?
Standard of Review
This case was dismissed on State of Utah's Motion to Dismiss under Utah R. Civ.
P. 12 (West 2002). Accordingly, the dismissal is reviewed for correctness accepting all
facts as true and according no deference to the decision of the district court. "Because a
trial court's dismissal of a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is a conclusion of law, we review for correctness, granting no deference to the
trial court's decision." Larson v. Park CityMun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1998).

1

Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5 (West 2002)

Addendum 1-2

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12 (West 2002)

Addendum 3-6

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (West 2002)

Addendum 7-8

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12 (West 2002)

Addendum 9

Statement of the Case
In June of 1999, 69 year old Katie Shafer came as a tourist to Park City, Utah from
her home in Florida. Katie, along with her daughters, decided to ride on the sight seeing
train 'Heber Creeper9 operated by Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority on June 23,
1999. (R. 2). Heber Valley places stools down for passenger to step on while
disembarking. (Id.). Upon return to the station, the train stopped adjacent to an unpaved
and gravelly surface. Katie, first to disembark, stepped down onto the stool. The stool
flipped out from beneath her and Katie suffered a broken leg during the ensuing fall.
Katie spent the remaining three days of her vacation in her hotel room.
On returning to Florida, Katie went under the care of a physician and began
rehabilitation. Initially, all medical bills were being paid by Utah Risk Management.
However, at some point, Katie began to receive unpaid medical bills. Katie, residing in
Florida, then contacted counsel in order to protect her interests and preserve her claims.
Counsel initially delivered a Notice of Claim to Attorney General Jan Graham and Craig
Lacey, executive director for Heber Valley Railroad, via regular postage on May 5, 2000.
Then, on June 5, 2000, counsel resent the same Notice of Claim via certified mail.
2

Return Receipts were received for delivery to, and acceptance by, both the attorney
general for the State and the executive director for Heber Valley. (R. 81, 83). After
negotiations with Department of Risk Management adjustor Paul Watson failed, a
Complaint was filed on October 6, 2000. (R. 1).
On May 29, 2001, the State moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the notice
of claim requirements. The State argued that the notice was deficient because, although
mailed to an address where the attorney general keeps an office, it was the wrong office
at which to deliver a notice of claim. (R. 61-63). The State also argued that delivering a
notice to Heber Valley's executive director simply did not apply. The district court,
Judge Leslie Lewis presiding, agreed with the State's argument. (R. 107-09). The
district court then dismissed Katie Shafer's on February 25, 2002. This appeal followed.
Summary of the Argument
Appellant Katie Shafer delivered notice of claim in satisfaction of the
Governmental Immunity Act requirements for three specific reasons. First, Katie
'directed and delivered' a notice of claim to the State's attorney general according to
statutory directives for mailing such claims. Under Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5(2)(c)
(West 2002) if a claim "is sent by United States mail and either registered or certified, a
record authenticated by the United States post office of that registration or certification is
considered to be competent evidence that the report or payment was delivered to the
person or entity to which it was addressed." Here, notice of claim was sent via certified
mail to Attorney General Jan Graham and return receipt received.
3

Second, while the State's attorney general maintains myriad offices, the statute
only requires delivery of a notice without specifying which office is competent to receive
notice of claim. Since there is no specific office identified, an ambiguity exists which
requires inquiry into whether the purposes of the notice of claims provision were met in
this case. Because the State had adequate time to investigate, the purpose of a notice
have been met and the Katie's claim should not have been dismissed.
Finally, the State operates Heber Valley Historic Railroad as a public body created
by statute. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(ii)(F) (West 2002), delivering a notice
to Heber Valley's executive director satisfies the requirements. Accordingly, the notice
of claim provisions were complied with and dismissal by the district court must be
reversed.
ARGUMENT
L

PROOF OF NOTICE OF CLAIM BY CERTIFIED MAIL IS
CONSIDERED EVIDENCE OF DELIVER,

Delivering a notice of claim to an office of the attorney general through certified
mail and acceptance of that notice satisfies the statutory requirements under the Act. The
Act requires that, prior to suit being commenced, a notice of claim must be "directed and
delivered to the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah." Utah Code
Ann. s 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(F) (West 2002). Claims against the State of Utah are "barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim
arises." Utah Code Ann. s 63-30-12 (West 2002). Katie Shafer forwarded a notice of
4

claim, via certified mail, to the Qwest telephone directory listing for Jan Graham,
Attorney General, 515 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. at 65). This office is
one of several listed in the Qwest telephone directory for Salt Lake City. Indeed, the
attorney general lists over The notice of claim was accepted as evidenced by the Return
Receipt. (R. at 81).
Directing and delivering notice of claim to the attorney general at a listed address
and through certified mail conclusively establishes receipt of the notice. Under Utah
Code Ann. s 68-3-8.5(2)(c) (West 2002), any claim which "is sent by United States mail
and either registered or certified, a record authenticated by the United States post office
of that registration or certification is considered to be competent evidence that the [claim]
was delivered to the person or entity to which it was addressed."1 The State argued in its
Reply Memorandum, and the trial court agreed, that there was "no evidence" that the
notice of claim was received by the attorney general. (R. at 90, 108). However, under
the statute, directing and delivering the notice via certified mail conclusively
demonstrates delivery of the claim.
Additionally, receipt of the notice by a person other than the attorney general
herself is also consistent with statutory rules of construction. "[W]ords used to denote an
executive or ministerial officer, may include any... person performing the duties of such
officer, either generally or in special cases." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(v) (West
1

"Report" means a report, claim, tax return, statement or other document.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5 (West 2002).
5

2002). No matter who received the notice at the address to which it was sent, they are by
statute performing the function of the attorney general's office when they accept certified
mail.
As noted in Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975)
"the 'filing' of a [notice of] claim should include these essentials: that it be ... delivered to
someone authorized to or responsible for receiving it." The attorney general received
notice of claim when the certified mail was received at a designated office of the attorney
general. If the person receiving the certified mail was unauthorized to accept it, it would
have been rejected and Katie Shafer would have sought to deliver it to a person who
could receive notice. Dismissal was inappropriate and must be reversed because there
can be no question that the attorney general received notice of claim.
This case is similar to that of Larson v. Park CityMun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345
(Utah 1998). There, "neither the Utah Governmental Immunity Act nor the Utah
Municipal Code states how or in what manner a notice of claim should be filed with the
city council." Id at 345-46. Relying upon statutory definitions and Utah R. Civ. P. 4,
the claimant sought to deliver notice of claim to the city council through the city clerk.
The Larson court found that because a statutory basis existed for the claimant's method,
the notice was effective.
Here, similarly, the Governmental Immunity Act is silent as to how and in what
manner a notice of claim should be filed with the attorney general. Unlike Larson,
however, Utah Code Ann. s 68-3-8.5(2)(c) (West 2002) is directly on point and
6

expressly recognizes that the certified mail receipt fis considered to be competent
evidence that the [claim] was delivered1 to the attorney general. Because Katie Shafer
delivered a notice in compliance with the statutory requirements, dismissal of her claims
must be reversed.
The trial court erred when it agreed that the notice provisions require the attorney
general him or herself to be served with a notice of claim. "The statute does not specify
which office to serve because it is the Attorney General who must him or herself be
served and not any one particular office." (R. at 108). Nothing in the statute supports the
proposition that the attorney general must personally be served with a notice. Indeed, the
statute merely requires 'directing and delivering' the notice. Moreover, common grammar
dictates that referral to a proper noun requires capitalization while useage of a general
noun employs lower case letters. For example: President George W. Bush vs. the
president of the United States. See, e.g., Harbrace College Handbook, 570-71, 11th
ed.(1990). Here, the legislature chose to use lower case letters indicating that it is the
attorney general in the informal sense, and not a proper person who must receive notice
of claim.
If the legislature desired to require delivery of a notice to the Attorney General
him or herself, they would have used capital letters to denote the proper noun form as
opposed to using lower case to denote the attorney general as an office. "In construing a
statute, we assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory
words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable."
7

Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah
1995)(citations omitted). The mere fact that the office is occupied by a person does not
mean that the notice of claim should be personally received by them.
Indeed, one of the very purposes of the notice of claim provision is to avoid
difficulties which might be associated with a change in the administrator after election.
"[NJotice of claim minimizes difficulties that might arise from changes in
administrations." Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977). Requiring
personal service on the Attorney General would not minimize difficulties arising during a
change in administration and would, in fact, complicate matters if the person served were
to leave office shortly after service.
Finally, three recent decisions of this Court, while 'strictly construing1 the notice of
claim requirements, are distinguishable from this case. First, in Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v.
Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379 property owners who were not even listed on
the notice of claim sought to join in an action. Because they wholly failed to file notices,
they were denied the opportunity to pursue their claims. Second, in Greene v. Utah
Transit Authority, 440 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, \ 13, 37 P.3d 1156 the claimant alleged
'misrepresentation' by a claims adjuster who suggested all correspondence, including the
notice of claim, should be directed to him. The claimant never even attempted to file
notice of claim with the board of the UTA as required by the statute.
Third, in Wheeler v. McPherson, 440 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 , \ 3 , 40 P.3d 632, a case
involving claims against a county, the claimants directed and delivered notice of claim to
8

the county commissioner and the county's insurance carrier. However, by statute, the
notice of claim against a county was to be 'directed and delivered' to the county clerk, not
the commissioners or the county insurance carrier. Id. at If 10.
The claimants in each of these cases failed to strictly comply with the notice
provisions, either by wholly failing to file a notice or by directing and delivering it to the
wrong person. Here, by contrast, the notice was directed and delivered through certified
mail to the attorney general, the appropriate person to receive notice of claim. Because,
by statute, the attorney general received the notice of claim, the statutory requirements
have been met and dismissal of this case based on failure to comply must be reversed.
IL

BECAUSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL LISTS SEVERAL
OFFICES. THE PURPOSE OF THE NOTICE PROVISION IS MET
WHERE THE STATE HAS OPPORTUNITY TO INVESTIGATE
AND SETTLE THE MATTER,

At best, there exists an ambiguity in the statute because the attorney general
maintains several offices yet the Act is silent as to which may properly receive a notice of
claim. The Salt Lake Qwest directory in effect at the time Katie Shafer delivered her
notice listed seven different addresses. The State admits that one of the above addresses
received notice. (R. 61).2 Neither Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 nor § 63-30-12 suggest
that a particular address is appropriate for receiving notice. In Greene, 2001 UT 109, f

2

Qwest listed the following addresses: 160 E. 300 S., Salt Lake City; 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City; 515 E. 100 S., Salt Lake City; 5272 College Dr. Suite 300,
Murray; 1594 W. North Temple, Suite 300, Salt Lake City; 55 North University #219,
Provo; 2540 Washington Blvd., Ogden. (R. at 79-80).
9

15 this Court observed that:
the legislature has explicitly declared how, what, when, and to whom a party must
direct and deliver a Notice in order to preserve his or her right to maintain an
action against a governmental entity... In the absence of some ambiguity, we will
not disturb explicit legislative requirements and read into the statute an actual
notice exception.
Here, the statute does indeed identify the how, what, when and to whom, but omits the all
important 'where.1
In Greene, of course, the 'where' was not at issue both because the plaintiff
admittedly never delivered a notice to the board as the statute required as well as the fact
that UTA lists a single address. Because the Act fails to designate a specific address
while the attorney general keeps several disparate offices, an inherent ambiguity exists in
applying the notice requirement.
One alternative would be to require delivery of a notice to every address listed by
the attorney general. This Court expressly rejected a similar solution in Larson. See,
Larson, 955 P.2d at 346, n. 4. Another alternative would be to do exactly as the State
suggests and 'serve' whoever currently occupies the attorney general position. Of course,
in order to avoid argument that the 'wrong' address was served and service accepted by an
'unauthorized' individual, claimants would likely settle for nothing less than service
directly on the Attorney General him or herself, where ever they might most easily locate
him or her, including their home. The more reasonable solution is to determine whether
the purpose of the notice provision was accomplished.
Although this Court has apparently never addressed the issue as to what must be
10

done when an ambiguity arises in the notice provisions in the Governmental Immunity
Act, the Court of Appeals has discussed the matter. In Brittain v. State By and Through
Utah Dept. ofEmployment Sea, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) Brittain was injured
when he fell on icy steps at the State Department of Employment. Brittain filed a notice
of claim under the prior version of the subsection currently at issue. That version
required delivery of a notice to both the attorney general and the 'agency concerned.'
Brittain delivered notices to the attorney general and the State Department of Risk
Management. After negotiations failed, Brittain commenced a legal action and the State
moved to dismiss on the basis that the notice provisions were not complied with because
the Department of Risk Management was not the agency concerned. The State argued
that the Department of Employment was the agency concerned, the trial court agreed and
dismissed the case.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals directly addressed the ambiguity in the
phrase agency concerned. "Because the term "agency concerned" is not clear on its face,
we will interpret the notice requirement of section 63-30-12 in a manner consistent with
the overall purpose of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act." Id. at 670. Brittain relied
on this Court's instruction that it "is necessary to consider the policy of the notice
requirement so that in any particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if the
intent of the statute has been accomplished by substantial compliance with the statutory
directive." Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980)(interpreting
notice provisions of Transit Act).
11

Where the State has the opportunity to investigate an incident, correct the situation
and possibly settle the matter without costly litigation, the purpose of a notice provision
has been met.
[T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the
merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.
Sta/*/,618P.2dat482.
Here, the State was given adequate notice and made aware that Katie actually
intended to assert her claims. The State, through the Department of Risk Management,
had been paying some of Katie's medical bills, even prior to her retention of legal
counsel. (R. at 76). Moreover, the State does not claim that it was never given
opportunity to investigate this case or that it did not receive the notice of claim.
Additionally, counsel for Katie Shafer spoke with Paul Watson, an adjustor for Risk
Management, after filing of the notice of claim. Mr. Watson indicated that he did not
want to have a trial and wished to settle the case without filing of a law suit. (R. at 77)
The primary purpose of affording the State an opportunity to investigate, remedy and
settle the claim prior to legal action was fulfilled.
Because the State maintains several attorney general offices, it cannot be heard to
complain that a notice was filed with the wrong office when no prejudice exists. Ample
opportunity existed in which to investigate and possibly settle the claim. The purposes of
a notice provision have been met and the district court decision to dismiss this case was
12

in error. Accordingly, Katie requests that this Court reverse the district court and allow
Katie to pursue her day in court.
IIL

DELIVERING NOTICE OF CLAIM TO HEBER VALLEY
RAILROADS EXECUTIVE OFFICER SATISFIED THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS,

The Act's notice provision may also be satisfied by delivering notice to an
executive or member of the board when the claim involves a public corporation. Notice
of claim may be directed to "a member of the governing board, the executive director, or
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public board, commission, or
body." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(ii)(F) (West 2002). Here, Katie's injuries arose
while disembarking from the Heber Creeper, a sight seeing train operated by the Heber
Valley Historic Railroad. Heber Valley is a public corporation created by statute. See,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 9-3-301 et seq. (West 2002).
The State admits that it maintains Heber Valley Historic Railroad. (R. 66) The
State also admits that Katie delivered a notice to Craig H. Lacey, the executive director of
Heber Valley. (Id.). However, the district court found the notice ineffective because the
claim was not against "any other public board, commission or body." (R. 109). Based on
the admission by the State that it maintains Heber Valley and the receipt of notice by Mr.
Lacey, the district court erred in concluding that notice to be ineffective. Accordingly,
the dismissal must be reversed because all pleadings and admissions indicate adequate
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notice was delivered.3
CONCLUSION
Because return receipt for certified mail shows acceptance of the notice to the
State's attorney general, delivery of the notice is considered established by statute.
Additionally, there exists an ambiguity in applying the Act's requirement of notice where
several attorney general offices are kept. However, the State had actual notice in this
case along with an opportunity to investigate, cure the environment giving rise to the
claim, and possibly settle the case. Accordingly, the purpose of supplying a notice has
been met and dismissal was incorrect.
Finally, the State admits operating Heber Valley Railroad, and admits the
Railroad's executive director received notice. Because the notice was received under the
Act's direction to deliver notice to the executive director, dismissal was inappropriate
based on failure to comply with the Act. The State should not be allowed to hide from
liability for the negligence of its agents where adequate notice was provided.
Accordingly, Katie Shafer respectfully requests that this Court reverse the dismissal.
3

After dismissal by Judge Lewis, counsel for Katie refiled a Complaint
directly against Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority in the Fourth Judicial District
Court. That action is premised on (1) application of the savings statute and (2) the fact
that operation of a sightseeing railroad is not a governmentalfimctionand therefore not
subject to the Governmental Immunity Act. Counsel for Katie Shafer invited the State to
stay the current appeal until such time as the Fourth District Court could resolve
inevitable argument on these two issues. The State refused this invitation. Nonetheless,
to the extent this Court finds judicial economy would be better served by a single
resolution and opinion on all these issues arising from a common incident, counsel for
Katie invites this Court to stay current appellate proceedings.
14

DATED: May 6, 2002

Peter W. Summerill

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on May 6, 2002,1
Mailed _
Faxed _
Hand-delivered _
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to:
Nancy Kemp
Utah State Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0856

Peter W. Summerill
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ADDENDUM

UT ST § 68-3-8 5
U C A 1953 §68-3-8 5

Page 1

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 68. STATUTES
CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTION
Copyright © 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2001 Supplement

(2001 First Special Session)

68-3-8.5 Mailing reports and payments to government —General requirements
for determining when the report or payment is considered to be filed or made.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Payment" means monies required or authorized to be paid.
(b) "Report" means a report, claim, tax return, statement or other
document.
(2) (a) A report or payment required or authorized to be filed or made to the
state of Utah, or to any political subdivision of Utah, that is transmitted
through the United States mail, is considered to be filed or made and
received by the state or political subdivisions on the date shown b y the
post office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate
wrapper containing it.
(b) A report or payment that is either mailed but not received b y the state
or political subdivisions, or received but the cancellation mark is
illegible, erroneous, or omitted, is considered to be filed or made and
received on the date it w a s mailed if:
(l) the sender establishes b y competent evidence that the report, claim,
tax return, statement or other document or payment was deposited in the
United States mail on or before the date for filing or paying; and
( n ) the sender files with the state or political subdivision a duplicate
w i t h i n 30 days after written notification is given to the sender by the
state or political subdivisions of nonreceipt of the report, tax return,
statement, or other document.
(c) If any report or payment is sent b y United States mail and either
registered or certified, a record authenticated b y the United States post
office of that registration or certification is considered to be competent
evidence that the report or payment w a s delivered to the person or entity to
which it w a s addressed and the date of registration or certification is
considered to be the postmarked date.
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UT ST § 68-3-8 5
UCA 1953 §68-3-8 5
(3) If the date for filing a report or making a payment falls upon a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the filing or payment is considered to be
timely if it is performed on the next business day.

History: L. 1967, ch. 179, § 1; C. 1953, 63-37-1; renumbered by L. 2001, ch.
16, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 § 68-3-8.5
UT ST § 68-3-8.5
END OF DOCUMENT
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U C A 1953 §68-3-12

Page 1

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 68. STATUTES
CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTION
Copyright © 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2001 Supplement (2001 First Special Session)

68-3-12

Rules of construction.

(1) In the construction of these statutes, the following general rules shall
be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute:
(a) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular.
(b) Words used in one gender comprehend the other.
(c) Words used in the present tense include the future.
(2) In the construction of these statutes, the following definitions shall be
observed, unless the definition would be inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the Legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means:
(l) all actions by a board, commission, department, officer, or other
administrative unit of the state that determine the legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more
identifiable persons, including all actions to grant, deny, revoke,
suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or
license; and
(n)

judicial review of all such actions.

(b) "Advisory board," "advisory commission," and "advisory council" means a
board, commission, or council that:
(l) provides advice and makes recommendations to another person or entity
w h o makes policy for the benefit of the general public;
( n ) is created by and whose duties are provided by statute or by
executive order; and
( i n ) performs its duties only under the supervision of another person as
provided by statute.
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UT ST §68-3-12
UCA 1953 §68-3-12
(c) "Councilman" includes a town trustee or a city commissioner, and

"city

commissioner" includes a councilman.
(d) "County executive" m e a n s :
(l) the county commission in the county commission or expanded county
commission form of government established under Title 17, Chapter 52,
Forms of County Government;
( n ) the county executive in the "county executive-council" optional form
of government authorized by Section 17-52-504; and
( i n ) the county manager m the "council-manager" optional form of
government authorized by Section 17-52-505.
(e) "County legislative body" means:
(l) the county commission m the county commission or expanded county
commission form of government established under Title 17, Chapter 5 2 ,
Forms of County Government;
( n ) the county council in the "county executive-council" optional
of government authorized by Section 17-52-504; and

form

( i n ) the county council in the "council-manager" optional form of
government authorized b y Section 17-52-505.
(f) "Executor" includes administrator, and the term "administrator"
includes executor, when the subject matter justifies such use.
(g) "Guardian" includes a person who hasqualified as a guardian of a minor
or incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment and a
person w h o is appointed by a court to manage the estate of a minor or
incapacitated person.
(h) "Highway" and "road" include public bridges and may be held equivalent
to the words "county way," "county road," "common road," and "state road."
(l) "Him," "his," and other masculine pronouns include "her," "hers," and
similar feminine pronouns unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intent or the subject matter relates clearly and necessarily to the male sex
only.
(j) "Insane person" include idiots, lunatics, distracted persons, and
persons of unsound mind.
(k) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" include land, tenements,
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims.
(1) "Man" or "men" when used alone or in conjunction with other syllables
as in "workman," includes "woman" or "women" unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intent or the subject matter relates clearly and
necessarily to the male sex only.
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(m) "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed, and the
word "year," or the abbreviation "A.D." is equivalent to the expression
"year of our Lord."
(n) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word "swear" includes "affirm."
Every oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced in the term
"testify," and every written one, in the term "depose."
(o) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and corporate,
partnerships, associations, and companies.
(p) "Personal property" includes every description of money, goods,
chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and all written
instruments by which any pecuniary obligation, right, or title to property
is created, acknowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or
diminished, and every right or interest therein.
(q) "Personal representative," "executor," and "administrator" includes an
executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special
administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under
the law governing their status.
(r) "Policy board," "policy commission," or "policy council" means a board,
commission, or council that:
(l) possesses a portion of the sovereign power of the state to enable it
to make policy for the benefit of the general public;
( n ) is created by and whose duties are provided by the constitution or
by statute;
( m ) performs its duties according to its own rules without supervision
other than under the general control of another person as provided by
statute; and
(IV) is permanent and continuous and not temporary and occasional.
(s) "Population" shall be as shown by the last preceding state or national
census, unless otherwise specially provided.
(t) "Property" includes both real and personal property.
(u) "Review board," "review commission," or "review council" means a board,
commission, or council that:
(l) possesses a portion of the sovereign power of the state only to the
extent to enable it to approve policy made for the benefit of the general
public by another body or person;
( n ) is created by and whose duties are provided by statute;
( m ) performs its duties according to its own rules without supervision
other than under the general control of another person as provided by
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s t a t u t e ; and
(IV) is permanent and continuous and not temporary and occasional.
(v) "Sheriff," "county attorney," "district attorney," "clerk," or other
words used to denote an executive or ministerial officer, may include any
deputy, or other person performing the duties of such officer, either
generally or in special cases; and the words "county clerk" may be held to
include "clerk of the district court."
(w) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign written with the intent to
authenticate any instrument or writing.
(x) "State," when applied to the different parts of the United States,
includes the District of Columbia and the territories; and the words "United
States" may include the District and the territories.
(y) "Town" may mean incorporated town and may include city, and the word
"city" may mean incorporated town.
(z) "Vessel," when used with reference to shipping, includes steamboats,
canal boats, and every structure adapted to be navigated from place to
place.
(aa) "Will" includes codicils.
(bb) "Writ" means an order or precept in writing, issued in the name of the
state or of a court or judicial officer; and "process" means a writ or
summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings.
(cc) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and typewriting.

History: R.S. 1898, § 2498; L. 1907, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2498; C.L. 1917,
§ 5848; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 88-2-12; L. 1977, ch. 194, § 72; 1977, ch. 266, §
1; 1985, ch. 21, § 45; 1987, ch. 161, § 286; 1993, ch. 38, § 76; 1993, ch. 227,
§ 383; 1994, ch. 223, § 16; 1998, ch. 369, § 25; 2000, ch. 133, § 164; 2001,
ch. 241, § 84.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Copyright © 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2001 Supplement

(2001 First Special Session)

63-30-11 Claim for m 3 u r y --Notice --Contents --Service --Legal
disability —Appointment of guardian ad litem.

(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) A n y person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to
the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3)

(a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(l) a brief statement of the facts;
( n ) the nature of the claim asserted; and
( i n ) the damages incurred b y the claimant so far as they are known.

(b) The notice of claim shall b e :
(I) signed b y the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
( n ) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an
incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the
claim is against a school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against
a special district;
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(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah;
or
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public board,
commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may
apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (l) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may
extend the time for service of notice of claim.
( n ) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable
statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
(d) ( I ) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim
against a governmental entity is sustained by a potential claimant
described in Subsection (4)(a), that government entity may file a request
w i t h the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the
potential claimant.
( n ) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this Subsection (4)(d),
the time for filing a claim under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13
begins when the order appointing the guardian is issued.

History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 2 7 , § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987,
ch. 75, § 4; 1991, ch. 76, § 6; 1998, ch. 164, § 1; 2000, ch. 157, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30-11
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

Copyright © 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2001 Supplement (2 001 First Special Session)

63-30-12

Claim against state or its employee --Time for filing notice.

A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-3011, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.

History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch. 27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987,
ch. 75, § 5; 1998, ch. 164, § 2.

U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30-12
UT ST § 63-30-12
END OF DOCUMENT
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